









Laurie Berg and Jenni Millbank 
 
 
Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney 
PO BOX 123, Broadway NSW 2007 Australia 




This is a preprint of an article which will appear in published 





This  article  draws  upon psychological  and  sociological  literature  to  explore the  issues  that  arise  in 
eliciting  and  presenting  a  refugee  narrative  when the claim  is based  upon sexual  orientation.  Rigid 
notions of homosexual identity may consciously or subconsciously shape decision-makers’ approaches in 
this field. First, we identify psycho-social issues of particular significance to lesbian, gay and bisexual 
claimants which may act as barriers to eliciting their narrative of self-identity, including: a reluctance to 
reveal group membership as the basis of a claim, the experience of passing or concealment strategies, 
the  impact   of  shame   and   depression  on  memory,  common  experience  of  sexual   assault,   and 
sexualisation of the identity narrative in the legal process. Secondly, we explore factors which inhibit the 
reception of such narratives in the legal process. In particular we explore the psychological ‘stage model’ 
of sexual identity development and examine the pervasive impact this model has had upon decision- 
makers’ ‘pre-understanding’ of sexual identity development as a uniform and linear trajectory. 
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Over the past 15 years many thousands  of refugee claims based upon sexual orientation  have been 
made under the Refugees Convention. Despite initial doubt over whether sexual orientation could be 
regarded as a particular social group for the purposes of the Convention, by the mid to late 1990s this 
was well accepted in most refugee receiving nations (Dauvergne and Millbank 2003, 97, although note 
there is continued divergence in the approach of the various circuits of the federal appellate courts in 
the  United  States:  see  O’Dwyer  2008).  Subsequently,  the major  focus  of contest  in sexuality  based 
claims was the interpretation  of persecution, in particular whether criminal sanctions for homosexual 









order to avoid persecution (Millbank 2005). These questions of law have gradually become more settled 
(UNHCR 2008, paras 17-22, 12-13, 25-26) although still contested in some jurisdictions, in particular the 
United Kingdom (UK) (Millbank 2009a). Issues of factual assessment, which have always been significant, 
now  appear  to be rising  in prominence.  Decision-makers  in countries  such  as Australia  and Canada 
appear increasingly likely to disbelieve that the applicant is actually gay, lesbian or bisexual on the basis 
that her or his claimed identity is not ‘plausible’ (Millbank 2009b). 
 
This article draws upon psychological  and sociological  literature  to explore  the particular  issues that 
arise in eliciting and presenting a refugee narrative when the claim is based upon sexual orientation. 
These issues are illustrated with reference to case examples from all of the available tribunal and court 
decisions from Canada, Australia, the UK and New Zealand (see Appendix for details and limitations of 
this case set). While drawing on a large case set covering a 15 year period, we have deliberately focused 
upon decisions issued in more recent years in order to provide the most current picture possible. 
 
A narrative of sexual identity must be presented as comprehensively as possible early in the process 
because the requirement of consistency of later testimony is such a significant feature of refugee 
adjudication,  leading to an undue focus on the ‘first’ account  and concurrent  neglect of any original 
content  presented  at oral hearing  (Amnesty  2004,  20; Byrne 2008,  627; Kneebone  1998,  82; Coffey 
2003, 388-9). While many claims to refugee status rest largely, or entirely, upon the personal narrative 
of the applicant, this is more likely in claims which are based upon sexual orientation.   Refugee claims 
based upon political opinion, nationality, race or religion will more commonly have some form of 
independent verification of group membership, whereas a claim to belong to a particular social group on 
the basis of sexual orientation depends upon the presentation of a very internal form of self identity. 
We found a common refrain in case law that ‘allegations’ of gay identity are easy to make and hard to 
disprove  (Millbank  2009b). Furthermore,  while  claimants  on  all  grounds  often  face  the  difficulty  of 
speaking   about  experiences   of  torture  and  trauma,  including  sexual  assault,  in  recounting  past 
persecution, sexual orientation claims are unique in the sense that extremely private experiences infuse 
all  aspects  of the  claim.  Feelings  of  shame  and  self-repression  in revealing  the  kind  of information 
necessary to make a claim of group membership manifest distinctively in sexual orientation claims, even 
though similar difficulties may arise in detailing persecution on other grounds (LaViolette 2004, 5). 
 
How the asylum claim is articulated depends on the relational interaction between advocate or decision- 
maker and asylum seeker at every stage of the process; it is a story told and received in highly mediated 







life as lived, the flow of events that touch on a person’s life; life as experienced, how the person 
perceives and ascribes meaning to what happens, drawing on previous experience and cultural 
repertoires; and life as told, how experience is framed and articulated in a particular context and 
to a particular audience. Past experience is always remembered and interpreted in the light of 
the present as well as by the way that the future is imagined. What is remembered and told is 
also situational, shaped not least through the contingencies of the encounter between narrator 
and  listener  and  the  power  relationship  between  them.  (Eastmond  2007,  249,  emphasis  in 
original). 
 
The immediate context of personal disclosure for claimants during the asylum process is shaped by the 
legal requirement of proving a well-founded fear. British researchers have observed that, in this way, 
the ‘emotional  condition  is at the heart of the legal definition’  (Herlihy and Turner 2007a, 268). Yet 
Gregor Noll argues that the power dynamics of refugee determination procedures dictate that the 
construction of the applicant’s life story cannot challenge foundational tenets of the decision-maker’s 
understanding of the world (Noll 2006, 499).  The refugee is most likely to be seen when she or he looks 
like ‘us’ or, when that is not possible, looks like what is being looked for (Millbank 2002, 155ff). As we 
explain below, what is being looked for is heavily influenced by Western conceptions of the linear 
formation and ultimate fixity of sexual identity. At the same time, there seems to be little awareness of 
the psychological issues faced by lesbian, gay or bisexual individuals which can impact upon how such 
identities are negotiated in the asylum interview, and how any narrative of self-identity is framed in the 
initial application. 
 
In the first section of this article we outline some of the barriers to eliciting an applicant’s narrative of 
self-identity. In the second part we address barriers to the presentation and reception of such narratives 
in  the  legal  process.  In  particular  we  explore  the  psychological  ‘stage  model’  of  sexual  identity 
development and examine the pervasive impact it has had upon decision-makers’ ‘pre-understanding’ of 





ELICITING AN IDENTITY NARRATIVE 
 
 
In refugee claims concerning sexual orientation independent verification of group membership is often 
unavailable, and may be given little weight even when present.   Few claimants are able to present a 
partner from a current same-sex relationship.  Advocates may therefore seek to prove the claimant’s 
sexuality  through  introducing  documentary  evidence  such  as photographs  of lovers,  membership  of 





Paradoxically, while decision-makers preferred ‘objective’ verification, our research also found 
documentary evidence frequently disregarded as self-serving or staged (eg Australia N05/50659 [2005]; 
Canada  Yakovenko  [2004]).  Likewise  counsellors’  opinions  on  sexual  identity  were  vulnerable  to 
dismissal as simply a retelling of the applicant’s own narrative (eg Canada T99-06929 [2000]; see also 
Herlihy, Gleeson, Turner 2009). Thus, overwhelmingly, it was the applicant’s own testimony of her or his 
self-identity that founded the claim. 
 
The context of asylum claims means that every claim is expressed amidst some degree of emotional 
distress; claimants may have suffered physical and/or sexual violence, witnessed traumatic incidents, 
experienced the violent loss of loved ones or conducted much of their lives in secret under threat of 
persecution. Psychological issues of particular significance to lesbian, gay and bisexual claimants include: 
a  reluctance  to  reveal  group  membership  as  the  basis  of  a  claim,  the  experience  of  passing  or 
concealment strategies, the impact of shame and depression on memory, common experience of sexual 
assault, and sexualisation of the identity narrative in the legal process. 
 
Reluctance to Reveal Group Membership 
 
 
Prevailing societal homophobia provokes feelings of shame and the consciousness of being the subject 
of disapproval or disgrace.  Feelings of internalised shame may be particularly strong in lesbians and gay 
men because their experiences of discrimination and stigmatisation have persisted without the coping 
mechanisms   available   to   other   minorities.   Unlike   other   traditionally   oppressed   groups,   sexual 
orientation is not necessarily a visible characteristic; it has to be revealed and is likely to be experienced 
for some time in isolation and secrecy. A recent psychological study found that one in four Asian self- 
identified gay or bisexual men in China, Korea, Japan and the US had not told even one friend about 
their sexual orientation (Kimmel and Yi 2004, 164). In particularly repressive societies disclosing one’s 
sexual orientation may simply be too threatening, such that many lesbians and gay men suppress their 
identities,  dealing  with  their  emotional  reactions  to  their  sexual  orientation  without  any  assistance 
(Chung  and Katayama  1998,  23). It may  not be possible  to identify  others  with  similar  experiences 
because  lesbian  and  gay  communities   are  invisible  in  the  country  of  origin  or  because  fear  of 
repercussions prevents emerging lesbians or gay men from seeking them out (Meyer 1995, 41; Flowers 
and Buston 2001, 52). 
 
Claimants may therefore have talked to only a handful of people, or none at all, about their sexual 





perception of the decision-maker,  advocate or translator will significantly affect whether the claimant 
feels sufficiently comfortable and safe to disclose her or his identity. A sense that the interviewer is not 
receptive to, or is sceptical about, the applicant’s homosexuality will also weigh in the applicant’s risk 
assessment as to the prudence of revealing their sexuality. Further, the claimant’s willingness to disclose 
may  also  be  affected  by  the  sexual,  gender  or  cultural  identity  of  the  questioner.  Psychological 
researchers have found gay men of minority cultures often experience a tension between these two 
aspects of their identities (Bhugra 1997, 556) and may therefore be more reluctant to come out in a 
setting which includes someone from the same culture. We found that decision-makers often failed to 
notice or consider the impact of a same-culture or opposite-sex translator on the ability of a claimant in 
sexual orientation matters to tell their story (Millbank 2009a; see also LaViolette 2004, 6). The onus to 
identify and raise such issues therefore rests heavily upon advisors. 
 
Lesbian and gay applicants from countries in which homophobia is state sanctioned or encouraged may 
find it hard to imagine that state officials could be anything other than hostile to discussion of 
homosexuality.  They are also more likely than claimants  on other grounds  to be unaware  that their 
group membership is a recognised basis for a refugee claim in the receiving nation (LaViolette 2004, 6). 
Our review of decided cases found that delay in making a refugee claim, or in articulating sexuality as 
the basis for a claim, was relatively commonplace (Millbank 2009b). Advisers should therefore not be 
surprised if sexual orientation is first mentioned by the applicant relatively late in the process, and may 
indeed be prefaced by a false, or weak, claim on another ground. 
 
Concealment and Avoidance Strategies 
 
 
Because gay men and lesbians are exposed to a range of negative stereotypes long before they realise 
their own sexual orientation, the internalisation of these negative images complicates the development 
of a self-assured, integrated gay or lesbian identity. Pervasive effects from such internalised shame have 
been found even in a group of highly educated, occupationally successful, predominantly White lesbians 
in the United States (Wells and Hansen 2003, 104). As a result, lesbians, bisexuals and gay men may 
adopt  strategies  to  evade  or  manage  the  stigma  of  being  labelled  as  homosexual  which  involve 
selectively disowning their sexual orientation to themselves and to others (Troiden 1989). 
 
Thus, applicants may display vestiges of past or current denial about their homosexual feelings, extreme 
ambivalence about their sexuality, or use terminology that is redolent of homophobia. When applicants 





that this was often taken as evidence  that they were not actually gay, for example in an Australian 
decision from 2001: 
 
he said he did not mention this fact because both the interviewer and interpreter for his entry 
interview were women and that he therefore could not talk about his ‘problem’ with them. By 
‘problem’   he   indicated   that   he   meant   ‘sexual   problem’,   the   term   he   used   to   describe 
homosexuality throughout his statement. Whilst claiming to view expression of homosexuality as 
a right, the Applicant thus also depicted it as a kind of deficiency or defect… 
 
The Applicant only ever referred to his claimed sexuality as a sexual or psychological problem. He 
showed no sign in his evidence of ever having seen his sexuality as a matter of private right. 
(N01/37891  [2001],  9,  20.  See  also  Australia  N05/51729  [2005]  and,  in  contrast,  NZ  Refugee 
Appeal No 73252/02 [2002] para 8). 
 
Such ambivalence may reflect internalised homophobia, may simply reflect the only language that the 
applicant has been accustomed to hearing and using concerning sexuality, or it may bear a negative 
connotation by virtue of the words chosen by a translator.1 
 
Many applicants may have spent long periods of time ‘passing’ as heterosexual, pretending in one or 
more  contexts  to  be  straight  in  order  to  safely  avoid  a  potentially  threatening  situation,  to  avoid 
confronting friends or family with their homosexuality or to themselves avoid dealing with difficult or 
unwanted   feelings.   Yet,  we  found  that  decision-makers   frequently   drew  adverse  inferences   on 
credibility when asylum seekers had adopted such strategies which were seen as ‘inconsistent’ with a 
claimed lesbian or gay identity (Millbank 2009b, an approach cautioned against by UNHCR 2008, paras 
13, 36). In a 2006 decision the Canadian tribunal held that a claimant from Nigeria could not be gay 
because he had married and it was ‘highly improbable’ that a homosexual would father two sons in such 
circumstances. While the Federal Court overturned this decision, holding that the tribunal had erred in 
ignoring the wealth of evidence on the need to live a double life in Nigeria (Leke v Canada [2007]) there 
appears  to  be less  understanding  of  self-denial  or passing  strategies  if  undertaken  in the  receiving 
country. In the 2004 Canadian case of Khrystych the applicant had a brief relationship with a woman 
after arriving in Canada. 
 
The  claimant  was  asked  to  explain  why  he  carried  on  this  relationship  with  Inna  given  his 
homosexual tendencies. In his written narrative, he explained that he wanted to be her friend, he 
appreciated their relationship and admired her. In testimony, he explained that he wanted to find 
a proper place in his life and to try and change himself.  (Para 6, emphasis added). 
 
The tribunal held that this was not a reasonable explanation and ‘did not have a ring of truth’ (quoted at 





Advisors may counter such scepticism by eliciting from the asylum applicant an account of her or his use 
of such passing or avoiding strategies and the reasons for them, such as the experience of negative 
attitudes towards their sexuality. Further, as we note below, the development of sexual identity is not 
universal or linear. Nor does it hold true that a claimant reaches some higher state of self-actualisation, 
coinciding neatly with her entry into the receiving country or her articulation of her claim for refugee 
status. Expert evidence by psychologists may be helpful in explaining to an adjudicator how ‘repressive 
social norms and negative experiences’ may impede the acceptance of homosexual identities, as well as 
the common occurrence of a mixed sexual history through such process (see eg NZ Re ED [1996], 7). 
 
Trauma, Shame, Depression and Memory 
 
 
An applicant may be unable to talk about an experience, or they may actually be unable to remember it. 
Dissociation  regularly  manifests  as  a  protective  mechanism  in high-stress  settings,  and  the  refugee 
status determination  environment is an obvious trigger (Bögner, Herlihy and Brewin 2007, 80; Herlihy 
and Turner 2007a, 269). Depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) have been shown to be 
associated  with  a  pattern  of  overly  generic  memory,  in  which  individuals  have  difficulty  retrieving 
memories  of  specific  events,  including  but  not  exclusively  traumatic  memories  (Herlihy  and  Turner 
2007b,  3).  Clinical  research  on  the  recall  of  refugees  in  Britain  has  demonstrated  that  high  post- 
 
traumatic stress and the length of time between interviews significantly raised discrepancy rates in 
autobiographical  narratives  (Herlihy,  Scragg  and  Turner  2002,  326).  In addition  to their  response  to 
trauma and persecution, claimants on the basis of sexual orientation may experience depression as a 
result of grappling with the development of their sexual identity, which may still be in a state of flux or 
uncertainty at the time of the claim. 
 
A number of recent empirical studies have explored the impact of shame and trauma on the disclosure 
of personal information in the refugee process. In a London study of refugees with a history of pre- 
migration trauma, those with a history of sexual violence reported greater overall severity of PTSD and 
avoidance   symptoms,   greater  feelings  of  shame  and  greater  difficulty  in  disclosure  of  personal 
information during their initial refugee interview (Bögner, Herlihy and Brewin 2007, 78). Three-quarters 
of respondents reported that the first time they talked about the traumatic event was after their arrival 
in  the  UK,  and  for  a  majority  this  was  during  the  refugee  intake  process  itself.  Many  participants 
reported feeling too traumatised, afraid or ashamed to speak at all or to tell all details in these early 











UNHCR Guidelines on Gender-Related  Persecution note that sexual orientation and gender claims are 
linked  in that  non-conformity  to  socially  or  culturally  defined  gender  roles  is  a  key  aspect  of  both 
(UNHCR 2002, para 16). For this reason, we suggest, sexual assault is likely to be a common feature of 
both  kinds  of  claim  (Millbank  2002,  161;  LaViolette  2007,  187).  Our  research  found  high  levels  of 
reported sexual assault in refugee claims based upon sexual orientation. In our study we found that in 
the Canadian decisions the reported rate of sexual assault was 45 per cent for lesbians and 24 per cent 
in claims by gay men.  In Australian decisions 37 per cent of decisions concerning lesbians and 7 per cent 
of those concerning gay men contained a report of sexual assault, while in UK decisions 28 per cent of 
decisions involving lesbian claimants and only 2 per cent of gay male claimants reported sexual assault. 
While the reported rate was highest in all claims in Canada and lowest in the UK it is notable that for 
women  it varied  little  between  the  three  countries,  while  the  difference  for  men  was  dramatically 
marked – from 24 per cent in Canada down to 2 per cent in the UK. Claims involving both women and 
men  who  have  experienced  sexual  assault  could  be  assisted  through  the  use  of  gender  guidelines 
originally developed to recognise the experiences of women. 
 
UNHCR gender guidelines state that ‘it is unnecessary to establish the precise details of the act of rape 
or sexual assault itself’ (UNHCR 2002, para 36, xi). UNHCR also recommends that claimants ‘should be 
informed of the choice to have interviewers and interpreters of the same sex as themselves’ (UNHCR 
2002, para 36, iii). Canadian gender guidelines direct attention to the need for sensitivity and training for 
those receiving testimony from women who have experienced sexual assault (Immigration and Refugee 
Board 1996, para D3). Yet national and international gender guidelines appear to have been completely 
ignored at tribunal level in Australia and the UK in cases concerning both gay men and lesbians (Millbank 
2009a).  In Canada gender  guidelines  have been very little utilised  in claims  by lesbians2   and almost 
 





usually   accommodates   requests   from  counsel   that  hearings   be  conducted   with  all-female 
personnel when it is believed that this will allow a woman to present her claim more fully. But 
when male victims of sexual abuse began requesting that female personnel be appointed to the 





Particularly disturbing is the 2003 Canadian case of Mahmood, in which a 25 year old man claimed his 
first male-male sexual experience when he was 15 involved being sexually assaulted by two older boys. 
The male tribunal member repeatedly questioned the applicant about details of this experience and 
disbelieved  him  because  he  did  not  spontaneously  report  pain  or  bleeding  and  because  ‘this  core 
evidence was not offered in a straightforward manner’ (para 21). 
 
When the claimant was asked what the boys did to him, he responded, they raped me. He was 
asked what kind of sex did they perform with you to which he responded simply they had sex with 
me. 
 
Even when asked by his counsel physically what did they do with you, the claimant stated they 
bent him over and told him not to say anything. When I asked if the boys subjected him to anal 
sex, he responded, they had. 
 
I am satisfied, on a balance of probabilities, that if such a rape occurred…the claimant as a 25 
year old who now has had multiple gay sex partners, would have recounted details of his first 
sexual experience, in a more straight-forward  manner than what occurred at his hearing. (Paras 
22–24). 
 
Here, familiarity with consensual adult male-male sex is taken to mean that the claimant will have no 
difficulty   in  recounting   in  detail   an  early  experience   of  male-male   rape.  This  is  a  completely 
unreasonable assumption. 
 
Gender guidelines are also relevant to the substantive interpretation of sexual assault as an act of 
persecution. In the 2003 Canadian case of Re BYU, the tribunal accepted that the applicant was sexually 
assaulted by a group of four police officers, and that this had been reported to police by staff at the 
hospital where he received treatment. Yet the tribunal held that the applicant had not displaced the 
presumption  of  state  protection  because  he  himself  had  not  gone  to  the  police.  It  is  particularly 
disturbing that this was upheld by the Federal Court on the basis that it was ‘reasonable to expect’ the 
applicant to pursue the police failure to act (Mora [2004] para 9). This finding flies in the face of the 
Canadian gender guidelines which instruct that when considering whether the claimant ought to have 
sought state protection, decision-makers should be aware of the specific impact of sexual assault on the 
ability  to seek  help,  as well  as the  possibility  that  sexual  violence  at the  hands  of state  actors  will 
increase the difficulty of substantiating a claim (Immigration and Refugee Board 1996, para C2). 
 
Yet despite the two extremely negative examples explored above, it is plausible that the dramatically 





represents a higher rate of reportage rather actually reflecting a difference in occurrence. If so, then this 
may be suggestive of greater overall sensitivity to issues of sexual violence in the Canadian process. 
 
Sexualisation of the Narrative 
 
 
It is not uncommon for tribunal members to question applicants about consensual sexual experiences, in 
order  to  test  the  veracity  of  the  applicant’s  narrative  of  sexual  identity  (Millbank  2009b).  In  such 
instances decision-makers  may expect that applicants can both vividly recollect, and clearly articulate, 
their first sexual experiences in order to demonstrate that they are indeed gay or lesbian. Both of these 
assumptions are extremely problematic. 
 
Firstly, the individual’s state of mind during such experiences may well have been one of inner turmoil, 
confusion or dissociation. Particularly if a great deal of time has passed, and/or if the experience was 
followed  by  negative  repercussions,  initial  confusion  may  be  compounded  by  a process  of habitual 
internal   denial  with  many  conscious   and  unconscious   attempts   to  forget  the  experience.   Even 
embedded sensory memory may not be specific as to date; a vividly recalled experience, for example, 
may be recalled only as something that occurred in winter, or on a cold day, rather than on a particular 
date, or on a Monday. Yet in the 2003 Canadian case of Charles (overturned on judicial review in 2004) 
the tribunal  member  disbelieved  the applicant  because  he could not name the exact  date, only the 
month, of his first sexual experience. 
 
Secondly, it is also important to note that any questioning about personal milestones, such as ‘first 
attraction’, assumes that questioner and respondent have comparable conceptualisations of sexual 
attraction which may not be borne out (Diamond and Savin-Williams 2000, 306). Such mismatch may be 
further exacerbated by the translation of what appear to be simple terms from one language to another. 
It is apparent from case reports that a question such as ‘when did you first know (or become aware) that 
you were gay/lesbian?’ can be understood variously by the interlocutor and the applicant to mean first 
feeling of same-sex sexual attraction, first sexual encounter, first sexual relationship or first conscious 
acknowledgement of any of the above to either oneself or to another person. In a 2004 Australian case 
the applicant gave different ages in response to questions about when he ‘realised’ or ‘became aware’ 
that he was gay. From a close reading  of the decision  it appears  that these two answers  may have 
referred to different life events: one referred to the age at which the applicant felt a same-sex attraction 
while the earlier age was when he realised that he was not attracted to girls, yet his credibility was 





culturally relative conception of the word ‘knew’ in the refugee context: 2003, 393). Interviewers may 
shy away from clarification of exactly what is meant through embarrassment, yet inconsistent answers 
arising from such lack of clarity can be devastating to an applicant’s case. 
 
Finally, it should not be expected that relating detail of an intimate sexual relationship will be anything 
other than a fraught, embarrassing experience for any person. Such difficulties are exacerbated when 
the  experiences  are  of  same-sex  attraction.  The  process  may  also  be  transformed  from  generally 
mortifying to particularly discriminatory if the form of questioning is intrusive or use of terminology 
inappropriate  (for  example  in  one  Australian  case,  a  witness  giving  evidence  that  he  believed  the 
applicant to be gay was suddenly asked by the tribunal, ‘When did you have sex with him last?’ and in 
the same hearing the applicant himself was asked ‘Did you adopt a male or female role in those 
relationships?’: quoted on re-hearing RRT Reference 060403696 [2006]). We found sexually specific 
questioning of applicants in the hearing process was commonplace and that hesitation, vagueness and 
lack  of  a  ‘free-flowing’   response  were  often  taken  as  adverse  to  applicants’  credibility  in  such 
circumstances (Millbank 2009b). For example, in 2006 the Federal Court of Canada found that ‘it was 
open to the Board to draw a negative inference  from the Applicant’s  inability to clearly describe his 
sexual  activities  with  his  alleged  lover  in  Georgia’  (Magradze   [2006]  para  6,  emphasis   added). 
Particularly troubling is the 2004 Canadian case of Kravchenko in which a 45 year old male claimant from 
the Ukraine was found to be ‘vague and hesitant in his testimony with respect to his experiences as a 
homosexual person’ (para 8): 
 
The claimant was asked to describe how he and Vladimir became lovers. He testified by mutual 
consent. The claimant was asked again. He hesitated, saying that it was an intimate thing. The 
claimant based his claim on being a homosexual man. He was represented by counsel and knew 
that the onus was on him to establish his claim, but was vague in describing how the relationship 
was established. The claimant alleged that he was invited to Vladimir's place for tea, that he was 
the only one who went there and went about once a week. 
 
The claimant  was asked  how  Vladimir  let him know  he  was interested  in the claimant.  The 
claimant alleged that they had preliminary conversations, that it was not premeditated, was 
impromptu and that they became lovers. The member declared specialized knowledge, indicating 
that she was aware that at this period in Ukraine's history, homosexuality was a crime. Given this, 
the claimant was asked how the relationship went from an invitation to tea to becoming lovers. 
The claimant alleged that they established a kinship, began with caresses and then the act itself 
took place. The claimant was asked how Vladimir knew that the claimant would be receptive to his 
advances. The claimant again hesitated and alleged that it was souls gravitating  to each other. 





prepared to answer such a question. When asked what Vladimir said to him with respect to his 
interest in him sexually, the claimant responded that that is how it happened. ... 
 
The claimant could not explain how the intimate relationship started and refused to explain how 
Vladimir, a sergeant, would take the risk of communicating his interest in the claimant as a lover. 
… On a balance of probabilities, I find that the claimant had difficulty in describing elements of the 
alleged relationship with Vladimir because no such relationship existed. (Kravchenko [2004] paras 
10–12.  The  decision  was  overturned  on  judicial  review,  for  other  reasons  discussed  below: 
Kravchenko [2005]). 
 
This kind of questioning would surely be confronting even for people who were secure in their sexuality 
and well accepted by peers and family. It is also hard to conjecture in this case how one could satisfy the 
tribunal regarding a ‘plausible’ mode of communication of sexual attraction taking place in the context 
of a persecutory cultural environment. For this reason, we concur with LaViolette (2004, 12) and UNHCR 
(2008, para 36) that although inquiries into areas that touch on the claimant’s personal experience as a 
gay man or lesbian will provide a solid basis for establishing that he or she is a member of the particular 





PRESENTING AN IDENTITY NARRATIVE 
 
 
In training  materials  developed  for the Canadian  refugee  tribunal,  LaViolette  suggests  that one may 
build  a  narrative  of  sexuality  that  is  not  about  sexual  activity  through  questions  that  explore,  for 
instance, when the claimant came to realise their sexual orientation, what kinds of discrimination and 
repression  were  prevalent  in  their  home  society,  details  about  any  past  or  current  relationships, 
whether  the  claimant  has  disclosed  their  sexual  orientation  to  their  family  and  friends  and  what 
difficulties  they might  have faced in doing so, and whether  the claimant  has spent time with other 
lesbians or gay men in their country of origin or country of asylum (2004). Given the great diversity of 
human experience and understanding  of sexual identity both within and across genders, cultures and 
other divides, there are few even broadly common aspects in the experience of same-sex attraction. 
LaViolette’s structured approach to eliciting a narrative of self-identity is helpful in that it focuses on 
perhaps the one universal in the experiences of lesbian and gay men around the world other than the 
actual  experience  of homosexual  sex: the hegemonic  nature  of heterosexuality  which forces  one to 





of a sense of self that reflects same-sex attraction is one of difference, triggering a process of identity 
 
(trans)formation/redefinition  accompanied by the experience (or fear) of social rejection. 
 
 
However,  dangers  can also attend a list of topics such as these in exploring identity if they become 
calcified in an interrogation style which assumes that there is a typical evolution of self-identity. We are 
concerned that this has in fact occurred in decision-making forums in Canada, Australia and the UK. 
Western understandings  of minority sexual identity development  have been deeply influenced by the 
idea of a linear process of self-knowledge moving from denial or confusion to ‘coming out’ as a self- 
actualised lesbian or gay man. This pervasive meta-narrative of homosexual identity was born in the 
psychological and sociological disciplines in the 1970s and now permeates popular culture (Liang 1997, 
288). So ubiquitous has the ‘coming out story’ become that open-ended questions about a claimant’s 
 
sense of their homosexuality  such as those proposed  by LaViolette  may be co-opted  by pre-existing 
cultural expectations  that sexual development  conforms to a linear trajectory.  Below we explore the 
origins and development of the idea of a linear ‘coming out’ trajectory, how it has played out in the 
adjudication of refugee claims, and why it is important for refugee advocates and advisers to understand 
and problematise such an approach. 
 
The Staged Model of Identity Development 
 
 
In  1979,  Australian  psychologist  Vivienne  Cass  proposed  a  staged  model  of  homosexual  identity 
formation (Cass 1979; 1984). This model theorises that identity develops through a series of discrete 
stages: Identity Confusion, Identity Comparison, Identity Tolerance, Identity Acceptance, Identity Pride 
and Identity Synthesis. According to this theory, the individual initially recognises some homosexual 
feelings or thoughts which lead him to inwardly question his own, and others’, presumptions that he is 
heterosexual.  Such  internal  confusion  may  initially  lead  to denial  of homosexual  impulses  and  self- 
loathing (Burke 1997, 84; Cox and Gallois 1996, 4). With a growing sense of a homosexual self-identity, 
the individual begins to experiment in same-sex encounters and may make contact with homosexual 
communities.  Negative connotations  of minority sexual identities may bring the individual pain and a 
sense of isolation and he is likely to prefer to remain hidden, ‘passing’ within the predominantly straight 
society. Only later does the individual reach a greater level of acceptance of his sexual orientation, 
selectively disclosing it to others and increasing contact with other homosexuals. Finally, the individual 
may achieve pride in, and a growing synthesis of, their identity with more positive self-regard, a deeper 
understanding of homosexuality as one integrated facet of the self and renewed congruity between the 





infused popular consciousness, shaping our cultural expectations of the ‘natural’ progression of sexual 




Critiques of the staged theory of sexual identity development include that it is based upon a specific 
cultural and gendered experience of sexuality that may not be more broadly applicable and that even 
within such caveats it cannot adequately  account for the diversity of human experience  of sexuality. 
These  criticisms,  and the role that the expectation  of a linear  staged  experience  of coming  out has 
played in the decision-making process, are explored below. We note that the stage model may be all too 
readily collapsed into an assumption that the ‘final’ stage of identity synthesis will occur in conjunction 





It is important to note at the outset that staged models of sexual identity development were derived 
from a Western experience and perspective, which may not be applicable to other cultural contexts. The 
majority of research on gay identity development has been conducted on White middle-class men in the 
United States with little consideration of non-Western expressions of minority sexualities (Rowen and 
Malcolm 2002, 78; Gençőz and Yűksel 2006) especially among women (for exceptions see Blackwood 
and Wieringa 1999; Blackwood 2000; Whitam et al. 1998). Expecting the sexual identities of people who 
live or grew up in non-Western countries to comply with a stage model overlooks the extent to which 
culture and social context powerfully contribute to self-perception  and behaviour (Vance 1989). Even 
within the United States, researchers suggest that men from ethnic minority communities differ from 
both White male populations, and from one another, in the timing and sequence of milestones in the 
coming out process (see eg Dubé and Savin-Williams 1999; Wong and Tang 2004, 155). 
 
In our examination of refugee status determinations, we found numerous instances of decision-makers 
drawing  conclusions  about  the  claimants’  sexuality  based  on  over-generalisations,  such  as that  it is 
‘typical’ for lesbians and gay men to become aware of their sexual orientation in adolescence (see eg 
Canadian tribunal cases, reviewed and disapproved on this basis in Eringo [2006] para 11; Dosmakova 
[2007]). Such an assumption, however incomplete a representation of Western experience, may be yet 
more  misleading  when  applied  to other  cultural  contexts.  Unfortunately,  when  cultural  relativity  of 
sexual identity was acknowledged in the decision-making process this was often done in such a way as 





cultures male-male sexual activity is not uncommon in early life due to heightened proscriptions on pre- 
marital heterosexual sex, leading to a clear disjuncture between cultural meanings attached to same-sex 
activity and same-sex attracted identity.   Applicants claiming to be homosexual  whose only same-sex 
sexual experiences were early in life (and especially those who had later heterosexual experiences) were 
thus readily characterised by decision-makers as having a ‘youthful transient phase’ or ‘sexual play’ 




Sexuality as Fixed and Discoverable 
 
 
In the refugee context, it is always the decision-maker  and not the applicant who has the power to 
name, the authority to decide who the applicant ‘really’ is and what sexuality ‘really’ means (McGhee 
2000, 34. See eg Australia SZEHT [2005] para 5). This is exemplified in the following exchange, drawn 
from transcript of a hearing in Australia in early 2003, quoted on judicial review: 
 
[Tribunal].  Right,  so when do you say that  you first become involved in homosexual activity  in 
Sydney? 
 
[Applicant].  Last year, a year ago.  That's when there was actual  contact. I did have friendships 
before that but I didn't – I didn't sort of decide on any further steps at that time. 
 
[Tribunal].  The note that  I've made is that  your first actual  homosexual  activity  in Sydney was 
roughly in September 2001. 
 
[Applicant]. All right. 
 




[Tribunal]. All right. Now - - - 
 
[Applicant]. It was winter, yeah, around September. 
 
[Tribunal]. The other thing that I noticed particularly in your statement was that you said, ‘I am still 
confused about my sexual identity.’ That suggests to me that you are not a person who has finally 
made up your mind that you are a homosexual. 
 
[Applicant]. Well, it is written like that because I have had sex with a woman as well and I cannot 





[Tribunal]. Yes, I saw that. 
 
[Applicant]. I know – I know what it is and I can compare it. 
 
[Tribunal]. And I saw that severally. 
 
[Applicant]. What is severally? 
 
[Tribunal]. Well, I saw where you said that you had had some relationships with women in Ukraine 
before coming to Australia  but I wonder if pressing that you would care to explain to me what 
confuses you at the present time about your sexual identity. 
 
[Applicant]. Well, I haven't had too many contacts – had too many relationships, I've had only two 
partners. I cannot say, for instance, that I've been heterosexual until 24 years of age and then 
suddenly became homosexual, I can't say that, that's why but now I'm with men only. This girl who 
is my witness, I mean, we lived in the same place for four months but we had no relationship and 
she was offended by that. 
 
[Tribunal]. But you've now told me that you regard yourself as being exclusively homosexual. Why 
say only a week or so ago that you're still confused about your sexual identity? 
 
[Applicant]. Well, I don't know, because I had sex with women. I thought that it would be incorrect 
to write anything else. 
 
[Later in the hearing]. 
 
[Tribunal]. I suppose my other difficulty is that accepting that you are a practising Roman Catholic, 
how you reconcile your Roman Catholic faith with your homosexual practices in Sydney - - - 
 
[Applicant]. Well, I never thought about that. 
 
[Tribunal]. - - - because I certainly accept that you're a Roman Catholic. 
[Applicant]. I never thought about that. (Quoted on review SZAKD [2004] para 8).3 
The tribunal went on to find that: 
 
At hearing the applicant admitted to still being confused about his sexual identity. Although the 
applicant sought to explain this statement it causes me to have serious doubts that the applicant 
is a homosexual. Further at the hearing when asked how as a practicing [sic] Roman Catholic he 
reconciled  his  homosexuality   with  the  Catholic  faith  his  response  was  that  he  had  never 
considered   the   matter.   This   response,   together   with   his   confusion   with   respect   to   his 
homosexuality is sufficient to satisfy me that the Applicant's claims of being homosexual are not 
genuine. Having regard to the current teachings of the Catholic Church, I am firmly of the view 
that a person of single sex orientation must have at least considered their position in the Church 
and whether  they wished to continue  practise  (sic) Catholicism.  ... I am not satisfied  that the 





This questioning and decision betrays a clear expectation that sexual identity must be experienced and 
articulated within certain parameters in order to be plausible. Here, a homosexual may have had early 
heterosexual relations, but these must be disclaimed in the process of adopting an exclusive, un- 
ambivalent homosexual identity which is then named as such (see also Rehaag 2008 on the frequent use 
of ‘confused’ as a descriptor of bisexual claimants in Canada). A homosexual identity also requires the 
conscious  examination  (and rejection?)  of any other societal  frame, such as religious affiliation,  with 
which it may come into conflict. Notably this latter approach has been rejected at judicial level in both 
Canada and Australia as relying upon improper stereotyping (Canada Trembliuk [2003] para 5; Australia 
SZAKD [2004]). 
 
Staged theories, like the model proposed by Cass, organise major milestone events in a linear sequential 
progression for developing a clear sense of oneself as homosexual in a heterosexual world. While this 
may well accurately reflect the experiences of some, it can lead to the misapprehension that there is a 
single path to one ‘real’ sexual identity, from the same starting point. The model suggests that everyone 
moves through generally similar stages, in the same order and without revisiting a previous stage (Johns 
and Probst 2004, 82). It also assumes that the whole drive of the process is for the individual to come to 
accept  his or her one,  ‘real’  sexual  identity  which is then acknowledged  to the world  at large.  This 
reflects an essentialist view that sexual orientation is either innate or established early in life (Troiden 
1989)  and  defines  what  one  ‘really  is’,  a  view  that  sits  readily  with  legal  approaches  that  seek  to 
 




Yet  we  contend  that  much  psychological  and  sociological  literature  demonstrates  that  rather  than 
forming  a unitary  ‘core’  of a person’s  conception  of self,  sexuality  is not absolute  and can take  on 
varying meanings as a dimension of a person’s life. So for example, homosexuality may be the basis for 
social (or group-based) identity for some people and personal identity (based on desire and behaviour 
with  no  sense  of  broader  social  association)  for  others.  Yet  we  found  that  some  decision-makers 
expected that members of sexual minorities would, as a matter of course, form a sense of group identity 
and either join or demonstrate knowledge of lesbian or gay groups. For example in the 2004 Canadian 
case of Laszlo the applicant had not known of an organisation in Romania called ‘Accept’ and this was 
held to impugn his credibility because, 
 
[i]t would seem reasonable to expect that the existence of an organization that is supportive of 
lesbian and gay rights would not go unnoticed by a gay person, especially if the panel is to believe 





This finding was upheld on judicial review as a ‘logical plausibility finding’ (Laszlo [2005] para 10. But see 
contra Charles [2004] para 10). We contend that such approach improperly collapses the personal and 
political aspects of individual identity and places an unduly high burden on claimants to establish social 
manifestations of what may be experienced by them as private sexual desires or beliefs. Requiring such 
outwardly  visible dimensions  of sexual orientation  is especially  problematic  in a persecutory 
environment. 
 
Further, personal and social identities can be contradictory such that people self-categorise as a 
heterosexual  (in terms of their group association)  but seek out sexual behaviour  with people of the 
same sex (Cox and Gallois 1996, 15). Equally, some people can arrive at a social homosexual identity 
without having ever engaged in homosexual behaviour. The staged model may preclude awareness of 
such possibilities by positing homosexual behaviour as a prerequisite to identity integration (Horowitz 
and Newcomb 2001, 15-16). This was borne out in our study as decision-makers were demonstrably 
reluctant  to accept  claimants  who could  not  establish  prior  same-sex  relationships  (eg Canada  KRU 
[2002];  Australia  N04/49292  [2004],  an  approach  expressly  rejected  by  UNHCR  2008,  para  38).  For 
example in a 2006 Canadian case the tribunal held that the applicant’s account of his feelings for other 
young men and solitary use of gay pornography in the absence of homosexual experience when he had 
been ‘in constant contact with boys’ at school had ‘not established his identity as a homosexual man’ 
(TA5-13949 [2006], 4, 3). Conversely, homosexual behaviour without an articulated identity formation 
process may be rejected as inauthentic. In a 2006 case an applicant who had never had consensual gay 
sex in his home country of Pakistan, had a previous heterosexual relationship and then formed a long- 
term gay relationship while in immigration detention in Australia. The applicant claimed to be bisexual 
but his relationship, while accepted as truthful, was characterised by the tribunal as ‘like many similar 
relationships  formed  between  inmates  in prisons  … simply  the  product  of the situation  where  only 
partners  of  the  same  sex  were  available  and  said  nothing  about  his  sexual  orientation’  (RRT  case 






Another significant flaw with the staged theory of identity development is that it was originally based 
upon male accounts. This model has since been taken as a generic account of homosexuality while 
excluding,  or  indeed  misrepresenting,  the  experiences  of  lesbians  (Morris  1997,  5;  Gonsiorek  and 
Rudolph 1991; Diamond and Savin-Williams  2000, 297). In fact there is considerable  clinical evidence 





including typically different sequences of events. For example, it appears to be more common for men 
to experience gay sex before consciously identifying as gay as well as more common for them to have a 
first sexual encounter with a male with whom they are not otherwise intimate. In contrast, women tend 
to internally identify that they are lesbian or bisexual prior to having any sexual contact and such sexual 
contact usually takes place within an ongoing relationship of emotional intimacy (Diamond and Savin- 
Williams 2000, 308). The 2007 Canadian case of Dosmakova dramatically illustrates how a linear male 
model of identity development may impact especially adversely upon women: 
 
The claimant was asked when she realized about her sexual orientation. She replied that it was 
only when her relationship with N began [when the claimant was 56]. While this is unusual, it is 
possible. But things must be probably so, not just possibly so. On a balance of probabilities, I find 
that most homosexual people have some realization with respect to their sexual orientation when 
they begin to explore their sexuality in their teens or early twenties, even if they suppress it, hide 
it, or fail to acknowledge it. On reflection in later life, they are cognizant of this perhaps latent 
sexual  orientation.  This was not the case  with the claimant.  She found  out about  her lesbian 
sexual   orientation   only  when  she  began  such  a  relationship.   The  claimant   stated  in  her 
[application]  that she was happy  with her husband,  although  she was surrounded  by women. 
While this is not determinative,  it adds to the claimant’s lack of credibility.  (Quoted on judicial 
review Dosmakova [2007] para 11). 
 
While the tribunal decision was overturned by the Federal Court which held that this conclusion was 
made on the basis of stereotype rather than evidence (as was the finding, discussed below, that the 
claimant could not be happy to make such a discovery about herself) it must be recalled that only a 
small fraction of refugee decisions ever go to review. In addition it is possible that there are many more 
first instance decisions where such views about the ‘probable’ path of sexual identity development are 
less overtly expressed. 
 
Much research suggests that the expression of female sexuality is far more likely to be fluid than male 
sexuality. A recent study into the self-identity and sexual experience of 167 young women in the United 
States, which included not only self-identified lesbians but also women with any physical or romantic 
interest in women, found that 
 
[c]ontrary to the notion that most sexual minorities undergo a one-time discovery of their true 
identities, 50% of the respondents had changed their identity label more than once since first 
relinquishing their heterosexual identity. (Diamond and Savin-Williams 2000, 301) 
 
Diamond and Savin-Williams conclude that ‘[t]he notion of “true” sexual minorities presumes categories 





several’ (2000, 303). According  to these researchers,  ‘variability  in the emergence  and expression  of 
female same-sex desire during life course is normative rather than exceptional’ (2000, 298). 
 
It  therefore   appears   not  at  all  unlikely   that  lesbian  refugee  claimants   will  have  had  previous 
heterosexual  relationships,  have interspersed  heterosexual  and lesbian  relationships,  or have 
maintained a heterosexual marriage while in a serious lesbian relationship. Yet such variability of sexual 
expression - either as the result of an authentic variation in attractions over time or through co-option 
of preferred sexual expression by dominant cultural norms - is often taken to impugn credibility (Canada 
AA0-1226/27 [2001]). For example, in a 2006 Canadian case, an applicant from the Ukraine, claimed that 
 
[s]he  knew  that  she was a lesbian  since  she was a student  at the technical  school  which she 
attended from 1974 to 1979. She tried to express her interest in a lesbian relationship in 1979 but 
her advances were rejected. She married to hide her situation and did not attempt a lesbian 
relationship until after her husband died, when in 1993 the claimant attempted another lesbian 
relationship but was again rejected. In 2002, the claimant met XXXXX and had a relationship with 
her which  they  hid for two years  until the claimant’s  brother  found  them  kissing.  (TA5-12778 
[2006], 1.) 
 
The third relationship ended when the applicant’s partner left her to move to England with a younger 
man. The tribunal rejected the account, finding that, ‘[w]hile it is not impossible for someone to be bi- 
sexual it is, on a balance of probabilities, not plausible for the claimant to make three unsuccessful 
relationships’ (5, 6). The reference to bisexuality as ‘not impossible’ suggests that it is the fact that all 
three women remained with, or returned to, men which rendered this account implausible. Likewise in 
an  Australian  case  in  2000  the  tribunal  held  that  it  was  ‘somewhat  implausible’  for  the  lesbian 
applicant’s partner to have had a ‘heterosexual affair in the middle of a long-standing homosexual 
relationship’ (N98/22328 [2000], 6). 
 
We found that women were disproportionately over-represented in claims based on ‘bisexuality’ in both 
Canada and Australia.4  Although it is hard to generalise because of the small numbers of such claims, it 
appears that applicants who self-categorise as bisexual have a somewhat lower success rate than those 
identified as homosexual5  (see also Rehaag 2008). Bisexual claimants may be seen by decision-makers as 
more able to ‘pass’ and avoid persecution by virtue of a heterosexual relationship (NZ Refugee Appeal 
No 75376 [2006]). Bisexual applicants are also more vulnerable to poor credibility findings if they are in 
a heterosexual relationship at the time of the claim. 
 
It may therefore  be tempting  for advocates  to choose  a term to categorise  the applicant’s  sexuality 





descriptor of the applicant’s identity or of their behaviour and, importantly, any shift in category or 
terminology by the applicant during the process is likely to be taken as adverse to their credibility or as 
suggesting a lack of conviction in their identity (eg Australia N97/15882 [1997]). Claims for group 
membership on the basis of bisexuality are particularly challenging for advocates who must take care to 
fully explore the transition or fluidity in the claimant’s sexual orientation  and identity and yet at the 
same time contextualise such variability in terms of the claimant’s experience of well-founded fear of 
persecution. 
 
Progress and the Expectation of an ‘End’ Stage 
 
 
The idea of a linear staged progress of identity development  may be all too readily collapsed  into a 
 
‘progress’ meta-narrative in which the end point of self-actualisation is represented by entry (and 
assimilation) into the receiving country. In particular we found that decision-makers commonly assume 
that once the applicant has left an oppressive or persecutory environment their sexuality will be openly 
and  easily  expressed  through  same-sex  relationships  and/or  an  ‘out’  identity  in the  ‘free’  receiving 
country  (eg  Canada  Akhtar  [2004];  Hussain  [2004];  Magradze  [2006]).  This  is  a  very  problematic 
assumption if the applicant has in fact continued to be closeted in the receiving country, has struggled 
to form relationships there or has oscillated in their self-identity through the process (see eg Canada 
Khrystych [2004]). 
 
Conversely, the progress narrative assumes that there can be no joy or freedom in the experience of 
homosexuality in the country of origin, only fear. When applicants have stated that they were happy, 
content, or had no regrets about discovering their sexuality, decision-makers  disbelieved them on the 
basis that the discovery could not be attended by such positive emotions in a persecutory environment 
(eg Canada Osayamwen [2004] para 10; GPC [2003] para 13). In the 2006 Canadian case of Dosmakova, 
discussed above, the tribunal stated: 
 
The claimant testified that she and N were friends from 1994 and that in 2000 she and N became 
lovers and N. moved in with her to facilitate her trip to work. The claimant was asked how she felt 
about her discovery. She replied that she felt happiness and sexually satisfied, that she was happy 
about it and had no regrets. I do not accept this as credible. The claimant was a fifty-six-year-old 
woman, living in a society which she stated was homophobic.  This departure from her previous 
life style was drastic.   On a balance of probabilities, I find that the claimant, if she suddenly 
discovered  that  she  was  a  lesbian  in  such  circumstances,  her  emotional  reaction  was  not  in 
harmony with the preponderance of probabilities which a reasonable and informed person would 
expect. On a balance of probabilities, even if the claimant does not regret her relationship with N, 





feelings. Therefore, on a balance of probabilities, I find the claimant not to be a credible or a 
trustworthy witness. (Quoted on review: Dosmakova [2007] para 11). 
 
There is also a prevalent  assumption  that, in addition  to being wholly  unwelcome,  homosexuality  is 
utterly involuntary. In the 2004 Canadian case of Kravchenko the applicant referred to his first same-sex 
relationship as ‘a voluntary thing, he realized that was really his path’ (para 8). When he referred to his 
sexuality as ‘his choice’ the tribunal asked the claimant: 
 
to confirm that he made the choice to be gay and he did so. I do not accept this as reasonable. The 
claimant   is  a  well-educated   man  who   understood   the   consequences   of  being   gay.   It  is 
unreasonable  that  such  a  man  would  choose  a  life  style  which  would  inevitably  cause  him 
problems … Although not determinative, on a balance of probabilities, the claimant’s description 
of his experience of his recognition of being a homosexual is inconsistent with someone who is 
truly gay. (Para 8). 
 
Whether the applicant in this case was saying that he chose to act upon his feelings or that he in fact felt 
that he had a choice to be gay is actually unclear, but it is striking that the decision-maker could not 
countenance the idea that being ‘truly gay’ involves some measure of volition. This finding was held to 
be ‘perverse and capricious’ and reversed upon judicial review where it was characterised as reflecting, 
‘at best’, ‘an uninformed view of male homosexuality; at worst, … reliance on preconceived ideas about 
 
homosexuality’ (Kravchenko [2005] para 6). 
 
 
The progress meta-narrative  threatens to fundamentally  distort reception of the individual claimant’s 
story because it implicitly posits that the refugee adjudication will occur at the conclusion of the process. 
This assumes that the applicant, having earlier struggled with self-identity, has now come to terms with 
it and can (or in the refugee context, must) reflect back: they are now out and can tell their coming out 
story. This is problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, this dovetails with a tendency within Western 
gay communities, psychological literature and broader society to assume that the ideal or healthy end 
state of this process is one of a full and final disclosure (Dindia 1998, 88). Yet coming ‘out’ is not a single 
definable moment but an activity that is continually repeated over time to a multitude of people in 
different contexts, with varying meaning and effect. Moreover, such an approach overlooks the many 
and varied reasons why lesbians and gay men choose to conceal or reveal their sexuality. As Gail Mason 
notes,  ‘the  decision  to  come  out  to  others  frequently   involves   a  careful  (although   sometimes 
spontaneous)  weighing  of  the  likely  rewards  and  possible  repercussions’  (Mason  2002, 81).  Mason 
argues that the ‘closet’, 
 
proffers a strategic means of control over the extent to which one is subjected to the undesirable 





discrimination and hostility… Once an individual makes a declaration of homosexuality there is no 
means to control or redress the ways in which that knowledge is interpreted by others (2002, 82). 
 
In  our  view  decision-makers  often  grappled  unsuccessfully  with  the  experience  of  applicants  who 
regulated the bounds of their own out-ness or exercised ‘information control’ (McGhee 2000, 46), by for 
example being out to a circle of friends, but closeted with family and employers, or who on arriving in 
the  receiving  country  were  out  to  a  counsellor  or  joined  a  lesbian  and  gay  group,  but  remained 
resolutely closeted to friends or other members of the same ethnic community. So, for example, in a UK 
case  in 2000  a man’s  claim  to be at risk  as openly  gay  if returned  to Pakistan  was  rejected  by an 
adjudicator  on  the  basis  that  he  was  not  really  out:  ‘although  he  behaves  socially  as an  open  and 
admitted homosexual, he has not informed either colleagues at work or his family’ (quoted and upheld 
on review in R v Special Immigration  Adjudicator Ex Parte T [2000] para 11; see also para 47). In the 
2002  Canadian  case  ZNB the  applicant  testified  he was  harassed  by neighbours  and  others,  yet his 
 
parents did not know that he was gay, a situation which the tribunal held was ‘not plausible’ (paras 25– 
 
26).  In  these  instances  the  expectation   of  out-ness  as  singular  and  universally   known  moment 
demonstrably worked to defeat the applicants’ claims. 
 
There is no reason to expect that most, or even many, applicants will be in the final stages of an identity 
synthesis process at the time they leave their country or when they make their way through the refugee 
determination procedures. In the Western tradition, the expectation of coherent narrative about life 
experience requires self-reflexivity. We expect a narrator to have objective distance about herself, to be 
able to describe different times in her life in relation to her self at present, such as, ‘I was married to a 
man because I felt I had no choice at the time; I felt terribly ashamed of who I am at first, but I have 
been much happier since I came out as a lesbian last year’. The expectation of self-reflexivity deeply 
informs adjudication of the narrative (Eastmond 2007, 249), yet reflective distance may not be a fair or 
realistic tool to determine the narrative’s truth or authenticity. One area where this has been most 
apparent has been the numerous cases in which applicants have been closeted in their country of origin 
and  not  faced  acts  of  persecution  in  the  past  as  a  result.  Recent  law  suggests  that  if  secrecy  or 
concealment of sexuality has been caused by fear of persecution then the experience of living in secrecy 
may itself be considered as a form of persecution (Australia Appellant S395/2002 [2003]). However, 
decision-makers  continue  to  find  that  applicants  are  simply  ‘naturally’  discreet  or  have  lived  their 
‘preferred lifestyle’ of ‘self imposed restraint’ (NZ Refugee Appeal No 71355/99 [1999]) – meaning, in 
 
fact, absolute secrecy – such that fear of persecution is either not well-founded or not for reasons of 





not clearly presented a case articulating their mode of living as a conscious and coerced response to 
oppressive  social  forces or a lifestyle  which may be subject  to change  over time or in a new social 
context: rather their life as lived is simply the way things are (see most recently in the UK: JM [2008]; HJ, 
Iran [2008]). 
 
Finally, a staged approach may be mistakenly interpreted as representing a linear passage from a period 
of poor self-worth to one of psychological health, leading to an unrealistic expectation of the applicant’s 
emotional state. In fact, Australian researchers who subscribe to the staged model found a significant 
decline  in  gay  men’s  well-being  and  increased  isolation,  distress  and  depression  during  the  middle 
stages of gay identity formation, while positive psycho-social indicators were higher during the initial 
identity confusion and the final identity synthesis stages (Halpin and Allen 2004, 117). Importantly, this 
is at odds with the lay assumption that well-being would start low and gradually and systematically 
increase as the individual becomes more and more accepting of his gay identity. Advocates and advisers 
should therefore be open to the prospect that applicants confronting the implications of their sexuality 
may well be experiencing  their lowest emotional  ebb at the time of making their claim, rather then 








There has been an increased tendency in recent years to disbelieve claims of group membership for 
lesbian,  gay  and  bisexual  refugee  applicants  (Millbank  2009a;  2009b).  We  are  concerned  that  rigid 
notions of homosexual identity may consciously or subconsciously  shape decision-makers’  approaches 
to sexuality in asylum claims. A stage model, while offering some insights into the process of sexual 
identity development,  may be both overly simplistic  and misleadingly  applied.  Despite instruction  by 
courts  in  countries  such  as  Canada  that  decisions  about  sexual  identity  must  not  be  based  upon 
stereotype,  the  conception  of  sexual  identity  development  as  a  universal  form  of  linear  ‘progress’ 
appears in numerous cases as a template against which the veracity of individual claims are judged. 
 
A Guidance Note recently issued by the UNHCR recognises the importance of specialist training for 
government officials involved in all aspects of the interview process, whether as interviewers, decision- 
makers or interpreters, and cautions that such training should engender not just a familiarity with issues 
faced by sexual minorities but also should encompass appropriate interview techniques (UNHCR 2008, 





‘mainstreamed’ in the ongoing training of officials, especially regarding the proper bases for credibility 
assessments of claimants. 
 
We  argue  that  it  additionally  falls  to  refugee  advisors  and  advocates  to  labour  to  overcome  the 
stereotyped assumptions regarding sexuality and sexual identity development which so often underlie 
such   determinations.   The   challenge   is   to   elicit   a   nuanced   narrative   which   explains   apparent 
inconsistencies and complicates neat categorisations of human sexual experience, yet at the same time 
to present this narrative in such a way that it is recognisable to the decision-maker and meets the legal 
criteria necessary to establish group membership. We acknowledge that such tensions may never be 
entirely resolvable, and necessarily involve compromise. However, we contend that an approach which 
is open and sensitive to the complex psycho-dynamics  of the client’s development of self-identity and 
acts of coming out can assist in both eliciting and presenting narratives for refugee claimants on the 











This data set comprises over 1000 cases, being all of the publically available tribunal and court decisions 
involving a claim to refugee status based upon sexual orientation in the years 1994-2007 (inclusive) in 
Canada, Australia, the UK and New Zealand. Australian cases were all obtained from the Austlii case 
database (www.austlii.edu.au). UK cases were obtained from the Electronic Immigration Network case 
database (www.ein.org.uk), the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal website (www.ait.gov.uk) and LEXIS. 
Canadian cases were obtained from the Quicklaw, Canlii (www.canlii.org) and LEXIS databases. New 
Zealand cases were obtained from the Refugee Status Appeals Authority website 
(www.nzrefugeeappeals.govt.nz).  There  were  a  total  of  528  Australian  decisions  made  up  of  369 
decisions from the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) and 159 judicial review decisions from the Federal 
Court of Australia, Federal Magistrate’s Court and Federal Court. There were 116 UK decisions made up 
of 70 tribunal decisions and 46 judicial review decisions from the Queen’s Bench and Court of Appeal. 
There were 397 Canadian decisions,  comprising  276 tribunal  decisions  and 121 judicial  review  cases 
drawn from the Federal Court of Canada and Federal Court of Appeal. There were 38 New Zealand cases 
made up entirely of tribunal decisions. The United States was excluded from the study due to the 
unavailability of lower level determinations. 
 
In Australia, New Zealand and the UK the original decision on refugee status is taken by a delegate of the 
Minister, who is a bureaucratic officer. If this determination is negative, the applicant can apply for a de 
novo  merits  review  of  the  decision.  In  Australia  this  review  is  undertaken  by  the  Refugee  Review 
Tribunal  (RRT)  which  sits  with  a  single  member.  In  New  Zealand  this  review  is  undertaken  by  the 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) which sits with two members. In the UK until April 2005 this 





immigration   adjudicator   reviewed  the  decision  de  novo  and  then  leave  could  be  given  to  the 
Immigration Appeal Tribunal (IAT) which until 2002 provided a second level of de novo review and after 
2002 was limited to points of law by the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (UK). From 2005 
the two-tier structure was abolished and replaced by the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT): Asylum 
and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 (UK). The AIT can only grant review based on an 
error of law. Canada is unique in that the tribunal makes the first determination. Until 2002 this body 
was the Convention Refugee Determination Division which sat in two member panels, with a difference 
between the members resulting in a positive determination. Since 2002 the new Refugee Protection 
Division sits with only one member. 
 
Note that although our set comprises all available decisions, not every decision made is released. For 
instance  in Australia,  while all RRT determinations  were released  prior to 1999, after that point the 
target for release was only 20 per cent of decided cases, and in recent years fewer than 10 per cent of 
decisions have been released. We estimate that the Canadian cases in our pool represent less than 5 per 






This research is part of a larger project examining gender and sexual orientation in refugee claims across 
the UK, Australia, New Zealand and Canada conducted with Catherine Dauvergne at the University of 
British Columbia and funded through an Australian Research Council Discovery Grant. Thanks to Anna 
Samson and the journal reviewers for their comments, and to Katherine Fallah and Marianna Leishman 
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This was recognised by the Federal Court of Canada in a decision overturning an earlier finding by the tribunal 
that the applicant was not gay because he used the word ‘normal’ as a synonym for heterosexual (Lekaj v Canada 
[2006] para 9). 
 
2  
See eg Ndagire v Canada [2005] where the board purported to apply the gender guidelines and yet questioned 
the claimant about why she ‘would allow herself to be sexually assaulted’ (para 9, emphasis added). Upheld on 
judicial review (JRN v Canada [2005]). 
 
3   The  judicial  review  was  successful  and  the  matter  was  remitted  but  the  application  was  again  denied  on 
rehearing (email communication with RRT 24 April 2008). 
 
4   
In Canada,  women  appeared  in 18% of  decisions  overall,  but  comprised  32%  of  bisexuality  claims,  while  in 
Australia women accounted for 16% of claims overall and appeared in 30% of decisions on bisexuality. 
 
5  
There were 23 bisexual claims in Australia and 19 in Canada in the entire study, with positive rates of 22% and 
21% respectively. This compares to an overall rate of positive decisions for sexual orientation claims in our study of 
26% in Australia and 32% in Canada. 
